In 1988, Ivlev proposed four-valued non-deterministic semantics for modal logics in which the alethic (T) axiom holds good. Unfortunately, no completeness was proved. In previous work, we proved completeness for some Ivlev systems and extended his hierarchy, proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the (T) axiom was replaced by the deontic (D) axiom. Here, we eliminate both axioms, proposing even weaker systems with eight values. Besides, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary (deterministic) logical matrices would be possible for all those systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them.
Introduction
Non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices) is an useful alternative in order to give a satisfactory semantic account of certain logics that are not characterizable by finite deterministic matrices. In deterministic matrices, the truth-value of a complex formula is uniquely determined by the truth-values of its subformulas by means of truth-funcions. In a non-deterministic matrix, the truth-value of a complex formula can be chosen non-deterministically out of some non-empty set of options 1 . It is worth noting that most part of standard modal systems can not be characterizable by finite deterministic matrices.
2 Taking this into account, it is natural to think if finite nondeterministic matrices can be considered as a useful approach to modal logic. Actually, Ivlev 1 Acording to [2] . 2 In fact, Dugundji proved in [15] this result for Lewis' hierarchy S1-S5, but this result can be easily extended to most part of standard modal systems. See [10] .
had proposed in the eighties a semantics of four-valued Nmatrices 3 for implication and modal operators, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without necessitation rule 4 . Ivlev assumed that everything that is necessarily true is actually true. In order to considerate systems without this assumption, we extended Ivlev's hiearchy 5 , by adding two new truthvalues. In section 1, we will discuss how those four and six truth-values could be interpreted in terms of modal concepts. In the first case, we will offer an alethic perspective; in the second one, we will suggest a deontic interpretation.
In a deontic context, we assume that what is necessarily (or obliged) is, at least, possible (or permitted). In this paper, we will propose weaker systems in which this principle does not hold. So, we can have modal contradictory situations, that means, propositions that are necessarily true but impossible. This requires eight truth-values. We will offer an epistemic interpretation of them in Section 1.
In Section 2, we will argue why non-deterministic implication and modal operators are required considering how modal concepts work in the natural language. We will start with four values, going towards six and eight values. After that, we will prove in Section 4.12 completeness for some modal systems with eight truth-values.
Non-deterministic propositional modal logics presented here clearly constitute a hierarchy. The point here, as shown in Section 5, it is not only that one system is included in another one. Moreover, it will be shown that any system of the hierarchy can recover all the inferences of the stronger ones by means of Derivability Adjustment Theorems.
In Ivlev's semantics, four kinds of implications are considered: those who have three, two, one or zero cases of non-determinism. However, no completeness result is presented. In another work, we proved completeness for some systems whose implication has three cases of nondeterminism 6 . In section 6, we will prove completeness with respect to deterministic Ivlev's implication, showing some relation between this modal systems, four-valued Gödel logic, fourvalued Lukasiewicz logic and Monteiro-Baaz's ∆ operator.
It is also natural to ask whether the use of finite non-deterministic matrices is essential for dealing with those hierarchies, or if a characterization by finite ordinary deterministic matrices would be possible. In section 7, we will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of these systems that are complete with respect to finite Nmatrices.
Interpreting modal concepts as truth-values
Consider the modal concepts of necessarily true, possibly true and actually true. Their negations are necessarily false (or impossible), possibly false and actually false, respectively. If we consider contingent as being, at the same time, possible true and possible false, this permits us to define eight truth-values:
necessarily, possibly and actually true; C + : contingently and actually true; In order to better understand the meaning of those truth-values, we can, first of all, grouping them into two subsets: + = {T + , C + , F + , I + } (actually true);
− } (actually false).
When a proposition receives a truth-value in +, we understand that it is actually or factually the case or, in Kripkean terms, it is true "in the real world". Otherwise, it receives a truthvalue in −; in that case, we interpret that the proposition is not actually or factually the case, or it is false "in the real world". The truth-values in "actually true" are designated but the truth-values in "actually false" are not. All the modal systems here considered are extensions of Propositional Classical Logic -PC. That means: all the tautologies are actually true and all the contradictions are actually false.
Kripke semantics for propositional modal logic also respects classical truth-tables, but there are models when the accessibility relation is empty in which all the formulas are necessarily true but also impossible 8 . Analogously, the values I + and I − expresses those modal contradictory scenarios.
Kripke argues that 9 his semantics, differently from Kant, distinguishes the concepts of necessary and a priori. In fact, for Kant, sentences (or "judges", in Kantian terms) are necessary if and only if we can think of them a priori, that is, not empirically 10 . But Kripke claims that "necessary" has a metaphysical meaning captured by his semantics: something is necessarily true if and only if it is true in all possible worlds. Therefore, in Kripkean terms, we can know something empirically that is true in all the possible worlds, and so, that would be necessary a posteriori. Reciprocally, we can know something a priori but there could be a world in which that would be false, so it would be contingent a priori.
The non-deterministic semantics proposed in the present paper, in turn, intends to recuperate the identification between being necessary and being a priori that most part of philosophers does, as even Kripke admits. In fact, this identification is not only in accordance with Kant's 7 These truth-values can be formalized in a modal language (assuming, as usual, the equivalences ¬ p ≡ ♦¬p and ¬♦p ≡ ¬p) as follows:
Modal languages will be discussed in Section 2.
8 Those models were not, in fact, proposed by Kripke according to [11, p. 49] . Actually, Kripke assumes in [22] that the accessibility relation for normal system is, at least, reflexive. Segerberg proposes an equivalent axiomatic in 1971, defending that, against "followers of Kripke's terminology", normal modal logics should cover those models whose the accessibility relation is empty, see [33, p. 12] . 9 In [24, p. 34] . 10 In the first reading of Critique of Pure Reason, the reciprocate does not seem to be true. Indeed, a judge is a priori if and only if it is necessarily or strictly universal. But necessity and strictly universality belong together inseparably [20, (B2-B3) ]. Finally, Kant affirms in Prolegomena that necessity and cognition taken for a priori are the same [21, (4:277) ] .
point of view. A correlation between the notions of being necessary and being a priori is found in others important philosophers, for instance, Descartes 11 and more contemporary, Russell 12 . To endorse that perspective, the eight values should be grouped as follows:
− } (a priori true and false )
In conceptual terms, let A, N and P represent the concepts of actual, necessary and possible, respectively. The Venn-diagram below shows the relationship between the truth-values and those concepts:
The values I + and I − do represent very artificial situations. In fact, it is quite reasonable to admit, for example, that mathematical knowledge is always a priori 13 . Assuming this, these modally contradictory scenarios would express that mathematics would be inconsistent. It is 11 Descartes does not use the term a priori in his Meditations on First Philosophy, see [14] . However, he separates the study of composite things, like medicine and physics, from simpler things, like geometry and arithmetic (AT 20). Gueroult, a Descartes' commentator, arguments that, on First Meditation, Descartes presents some natural reasons to doubt about the composite things, instead of the simpler ones, since they are the necessary conditions of all possible representations, that is, for those things that exist in nature, see [17, p. 17] . Those simpler things are intuited "with the eye of the mind" (AT 36). Besides, mathematical truths are "the most certain of all" (AT 65) and in mathematics there is "true and certain knowledge of it [scientia]" (AT 70). The Cartesian characterizations of arithmetic and geometry knowledge is very near to the Kantian notion of a priori. Because of those things clearly and distinctly intuited are necessarily true (AT 70), we can infer that Descartes defends, agreeing with Kant, that a priority and necessity are attached concepts. This approximation must be done, of course, with some caveats. For instance, both philosophers could disagree with respect to the role of the imagination in a priori knowledge, compare, in particular, Meditations (AT 72-73) and Critique (B 103-104).
12 In [31, p. 64-65], Russell defends that the term necessary should not be applied to propositions as ordinary traditional philosophy does; instead it should be applied to propositional functions: if a propositional function is always true, it is necessary true (for ex. "if x is a man, x is mortal"), if it is sometimes true, it is possible (for ex. "x is a men") and if it is never true, it is impossible (for ex. "x is a unicorn"). Further [31, p. 75] , he says that we know logical propositions a priori and one of his examples is the sentence "If all a's are b's and x is an a, then x is a b". That means that we know a priori all logical theorems. For soundness, any logical theorem is always true. In other words, what we know a priori is necessarily true. 13 Kant clearly claims that in Critique (B4-B5) and in Prolegomena (4:280), but similar thesis can be found in other important philosophers. Descartes doubts of all mathematical certainties througout the fiction of the Evil Genius, but this doubt is, as Gueroult stresses in [17, p. 20-22] , methodological, metaphysical and hyperbolic. Once it is guaranteed that God could not deceive us, it is impossible to doubt of mathematical truth, unless obvious contradictions (AT 36). Russell seems agreeing with that mathematical knowlege is a priori. Indeed, it would be contradictory if some mathematical theorem would be false. According to [13] , Russell's logicism consists in admit that logic and mathematics are both synthetic a priori and, as argued in note 12 , all logical theorems are, for Russell, known a priori.
hard to believe that most part of philosophers and mathematician would defend it. Anyway, non-deterministic modal semantics could express even those extreme situations.
It is more plausible to admit that our a priori knowledge is always consistent. As it will be shown, it is equivalent to admit that what is necessary is possible. In other words, we can not have propositions that are, at same time, a priori true and false .
That assumption forces a new relationship between the concepts of necessary and possible. Indeed, the concept of necessary will be included in the concept of possible, as expressed by the Venn-diagram below:
In alethic contexts, it seems reasonable to admit that an a priori judge can not be falsified by experience. In that sense, what is necessarily true is aways actually true.
14 In other words, it is hard to accept that something actually true could be impossible.
But alethic interpretation is not the one that makes more sense in a configuration with six truth-values. Since what is obligatory is, in general, permitted, we could use the same diagram below in order to represent the relationship between the concepts of obligatory, permitted and actual. They are represented above by the sets N, P and A, respectively. In a deontic perspective, the values should be interpreted as follows: Let again A, N and P represent the concepts of actual, necessary and possible, respectively. The Venn-diagram that represents both inclusion clauses is equivalent to that one: 14 It is easy to check that Kant respects that principle: according to him, anyone that is in an a priori domain can not be refuted through experience (B8). Considering that necessity implies a priori and considering that, according to our interpretation of modal truth-values, what is actually true is true through experience, that is, a posteriori; we can conclude then that it would be contradictory to admit that a sentence would be necessarily true and actually false, since this sentence would be, at the same time, a priori and a posteriori, what is an absurd. Kripke explicitly agrees with this principle (see [24, p. 36] ), even though his semantics forces that the relation between the possible worlds is reflexive in order to validate it. Both normal and non-normal modal logics, in Kripkean terms, respects this principle. For more technical results, see [22] and [23] . 15 This is essentially the meaning of the modal axiom (T), namely: p → p and p → ♦p. But if necessity implies actuality and if actuality implies possibility, we could have, in fact, only two concepts: actual and contingent. Let us represent them by the sets A and C, respectively. The Venn-diagram below with only those two concepts corresponds to the last one above:
We are not claiming here that non-deterministic semantics is the correct way to formulate Kant's logic. But in the same way that there is an approximation between the Leibnizian notion of "the best of possible worlds" and relational semantics 16 , Ivlev's semantics can be seen as an approximation between the notion of necessary and a priori, according to a Kantian perspective.
Some interpretations of logical operators
Let us consider an extension of propositional language based on ¬ and →, adding and ♦ as unary connectives. 17 In classical propositional logic, truth-tables are a formal semantics used in order to interpret the linguistic notions of "deny" and "implies". Modal propositional logic normally extends it, intending to capture the linguistic notion of "necessary" and "possible" through the symbol and ♦, respectively. 16 According to Noonan, Kripke semantics "brought back into the philosophical mainstream the Leibnizian language according to which necessity is truth in all possible worlds and possibility is truth in some.", see [29] , p. 8. 17 We could use as the only modal operator, defining ♦ ≡ def ¬ ¬. Reciprocally, we could use ♦ as the only modal operator, defining ≡ def ¬♦¬. We will consider both as the primitive modal connectives in order to facilitate the readability of modal axioms.
As usually modal logic are considered as an extension of PC, it is expected that formulas that are tautologies in PC should continue being true in any modal semantics. If we are thinking on modal-truth value terms, theorems in PC should always receive a designated truth-value.
At this point, it is convenient to recall the notion of Nmatrix semantics introduced by A. Avron and I. Lev. If Σ is a propositional signature, then F or(Σ) will denote the algebra of formulas freely generated by Σ from a given denumerable set V = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} of propositional variables.
Definition 2.1. Let Σ be a propositional signature. A multialgebra (a.k.a. hyperalgebra or non-deterministic algebra) over Σ is a pair A = (A, σ A ) such that A is a nonempty set (the domain of A) and σ A is a function assigning, to each n-ary connective c in Σ, a function (called multioperation or hyperoperation) c A :
be an Nmatrix over a signature Σ. A valuation over M is a function v : F or(Σ) → A such that, for every n-ary connective c in Σ and every
be an Nmatrix over a signature Σ, and let Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ F or(Σ). We say that ϕ is a consequence of Γ in the Nmatrix M, denoted by Γ |= M ϕ, if the following holds: for every valuation
From now on the multioperator associated by a multialgebra A = (A, σ A ) to a given connective c will be simply denoted by c, when there is no risk of confusion.
Let us consider, for now, four-valued modal scenarios as described in the last section. Let Σ be the modal signature containing the connectives ¬ (negation), (necessary) and → (implication), and let F or be the set of formulas generated by Σ from V. Consider the following:
In order to extend classical propositional semantics, a four-valued Nmatrix with domain {T + , C + , C − , F − } will be defined. The multioperators associated to the classical connectives ¬ and → of signature Σ must respect, at least, the following conditions:
But those restrictions seem to be very week . Take, for instance, just the multioperator for negation. Consider the sentence: (S 1 ) "2 plus 2 is equal to 4" It is clear that (S 1 ) is true. Indeed, it seems not be a posteriori true, but a priori true. It is natural to attribute to (S 1 ) the value T + . Consider now the sentence:
(S 2 ) "it is not the case that 2 plus 2 is not equal to 4"
It is quite reasonable to admit that if (S 1 ) is a priori true, then (S 2 ) would be also a priori true. If we accept, however, the table above, we can have the following situation:
So, despite (S 1 ) being a priori true, (S 2 ) could be a posteriori true (the two rows ending with C + ), which would be weird. In order to fix that problem, we must force that the negation of a priori true is a priori false. If we accept this, the same argument can be applied to the other values and we would have the following deterministic operator for negation:
The argument for constraining the multioperator for implication displayed above is a bit more complex. Take, for instance, two propositions:
It is clear that (S 3 ) and (S 4 ) are both a priori true. So, it makes sense to consider that "(S 3 ) implies (S 4 )" will be also a priori true. Consider now the sentence:
It is clear that (S 5 ) is impossible or, in other words, it is a priori false. This forces that (S 4 ) implies (S 5 ) will be impossible, that is, the implication as a whole must be a priori false too.
On the other hand, things are not so simple for contingent situations. Take, for instance, two contingent true sentences: (S 6 ) "Barack Obama is 1.85m height" (S 7 ) "Barack Obama has short hair"
Since both (S 6 ) and (S 7 ) are contingently true, it is expected that "(S 6 ) implies (S 7 )" is only contingently true, that means, a posteriori true. But take account now the sentence: (S 8 ) "Barack Obama is more than 1.80m height"
In this situation, "(S 6 ) implies (S 8 )" is not only contingently true but necessarily either. That is, "(S 6 ) implies (S 8 )" should be a priori true. In order to capture this non-deterministic scenario, we will say that the function "implies" attributes to the par of values C + , C + the set +.
Consider now the sentence:
(S 9 ) "Barack Obama has not short hair"
It is false, but only contingently. It is clear that both "(S 6 ) implies (S 9 )" and "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" will be aways actually false. It makes sense that "(S 6 ) implies (S 9 )" is contingently false. However, someone would say that "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" must be impossible. In fact, how could be possible Obama have and not have short hair? It makes sense, thus, to consider that "(S 7 ) does not implies (S 9 )" is a tautology. So, "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" should be impossible if we consider the principle that tautologies are always necessarily true. That is what happens in Kripkean normal modal logics.
Abolishing this rule, we can argue that if "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" would be a priori false, then (S 7 ) would be a priori true and that is absurd, because (S 7 ) is contingent. Therefore, the multioperator → must always attribute to the ordered pair of values
The point here is that a tautology is something that is always true for any valuation instead of "true in all possible world". So "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" will receive as a set of values always a subset of designated-values, that is, a value in {T + , C + }. But the notion here of necessary and possible is not a logical one, but an epistemic one. As (S 7 ) is only empirically true and (S 9 ) is empirically false, "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" will be empirically false from an epistemic point of view. In particular, if (S 9 ) is the negation of (S 7 ), thus "(S 7 ) implies (S 9 )" will be always false, because it is a contradiction, that means, it will receive as value always a subset of −. But this has nothing to do with the epistemic value of the complex sentence.
18
We can find analogous arguments in order to justify the table below:
Finally, the multioperator assigned to must capture the notion of necessary in natural language, while the multioperator for ♦ must capture the notion of possible. Thus, consider the sentence: (S 10 ) "Barack Obama is mortal" If (S 10 ) is necessarily true, then the sentence (S 11 ) "Barack Obama is necessarily mortal" is actually true. But is (S 11 ) contingently or necessarily true? At first, no modal semantics need to compromise with the principle that what is necessary is also necessarily necessary.
Reciprocally, if (S 10 ) is not necessarily true, then (S 11 ) is actually false. But should be (S 11 ) only contingently false or impossible? At first, no commitment is assured. If we assume that what is necessarily true is impossible to be false, this leads us to the following multioperators:
Kripke says: "The terms 'necessarily' and 'a priori' as applied to statements, are not obvious synonyms. There may be a philosophical argument connecting then, perhaps even identifying them; but an argument is required, not the simple observation that the two terms are clearly interchangeable" [24, p. 38] . Analogously, we could sustain that is not obvious that all the tautologies are necessarily true. A philosophical argument is required.
Let α and β be formulas of the modal language F or. The multioperator ♦ was obtained from and ¬ by interpreting, as usual, ♦α = ¬ ¬α. Observe that, by taking the usual notion of composition of multioperators in multialgebras,
where ¬x = { y : y ∈ ¬x} (see for instance [8] ).
From the axiomatic point of view, we add to any Hilbert calculus for classical propositional logic PC over the signature {¬, →} (assuming that Modus Ponens, MP, is the only inference rule) the following axiom schemas:
The Hilbert calculus composed by these axiom schemas (and having MP as the only inference rule) is sound and complete with respect to the four-valued Nmatrix presented above, and it is called Tm (see [6, 7] ).
Let now assume the principle that what is necessary is also necessarily necessary. In order to do this, and keeping the multioperators for negation and implication, we slightly modify the multioperator for (and hence the one for ♦) as follows:
From the axiomatic point of view, we add the axiom schema:
The system obtained is T4m, and it is sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding fourvalued Nmatrix (see [6, 7] ).
We could assume, reciprocally, that what is not necessary is impossible to be necessary. That forces us to assume deterministic operators for the modal connectives:
Consider now the system obtained from T4m by adding the following axiom schema:
The resulting system, called T45m, is sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding fourvalued Nmatrix (see [6, 7] ). 19 
Interpreting modal operators in a deontic context
We might ask what would happen with those Nmatrices if we abandon the principle that what is a priori true is actually true. From an axiomatic point of view, we can weaken (T), replacing it by the following axiom schema:
This system was called Dm in [6, 7] . From a semantic point of view, we will have six truth-values, as discussed in Section 1.
In a deontic scenario, it is quite natural to expect the same behavior that tautologies had in a alethic scenario. That is, all propositional tautologies will always receive a designated value. In this setting, the designed values are:
By reasoning as in the last section, the following deterministic operator for negation should be accepted:
Clearly, if the sentence (S 12 ) Drive safely is obliged, thus "Do not drive safely" will be forbidden and so on. The multioperator for implication is not quite obvious, as it can be seen below: 19 The systems Tm and T45m are originally called Sa + and Sb + , respectively. See [19] .
However, we have three arguments in order to defend the relevance of that multioperator. First, from a semantic point of view, by considering the Nmatrix formed by the negation operator and the multioperator for → introduced above, together with some quite natural multioperators for and ♦ (to be introduced below), were + is the set of designated values, we obtain a sound and complete Nmatrix deontic semantic for Dm. Secondly, from an axiomatic point of view, the difference between Dm and Tm is analogous to the one between the Kripkean systems T and D, in which the relation between the possible worlds is reflexive and serial, respectively.
20 Third, eliminating the new values T − and F + , we have exactly the Nmatrix for Tm. As we shall see in Section 5, this implies that the multialgebra underlying the Nmatrix for Tm is a submultialgebra of that for Dm.
Somebody could ask the linguistic justification in order to add a new case of non-determinism: when an antecedent is permitted and true and the consequence is permitted and false. For that, consider the sentences All those sentences are clearly permitted. Suppose that John smokes a cigarette, takes Peter's sheep but doesn't pay him for it. It is clear that "(S 14 ) implies (S 15 )" is permitted while "(S 13 ) implies (S 15 )" is an infraction. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the multioperator → attributes in a deontic context to the ordered pair of values C + , C − the set of value {T − , C − }. Two extension of Dm were considered in [6, 7] . If we force that obligations are always obligatory, we add the schema axiom (4) to Dm, obtaining the system D4m. Reciprocally, if we accept too that what is not obligatory is not permitted being obligatory, we add the schema axiom (5) to D4m, obtaining D45m.
Analogously to the alethic context, the semantic difference between Dm, D4m and D45m is only with respect to modal operators and ♦:
The resulting Nmatrices are sound and complete w.r.t. the corresponding Hilbert calculi (see [6, 7] ).
Some 8-valued modal systems
The next natural step would be trying to extend the proposed analogy between Kripke semantics and modal Nmatrices. In Kripke semantics, in order to characterize the system D, the relation between the possible worlds must be serial; by eliminating the axiom (D) it is obtained the basic system K, in which the relation between the possible worlds is empty. By recalling our analysis in Section 1 with respect to eight truth-values, and by considering the possibility of adding to K the axioms (4) and (5), Ivlev-like non-normal modal systems can be obtained, namely Km, K4m and K45m, respectively. It could be natural to consider, in our framework, the following multioperators for negation and the modalities:
From the axiomatic point of view, it is also expected that, by eliminating the axiom (D) in Km, we can provide a sound and complete system coherent w.r.t. the multioperators for and ♦ above. This is not the case, at it will be shown below:
Example 4.1. Let v be a valuation function over the proposed Nmatrix for Km, that is, in which the multioperators for ¬ and are as displayed above. Let S be any modal system that extends PC and derives the axioms (M1) and (K). Suppose that v(p) = {I + } and v(q) = {C + } for two given propositional variables p and q. Thus, by the ¬-multioperator, v(¬p) = {I − }. In addition, by the -multioperator for Km, v( ¬p) ∈ + and, by (M1) and the fact that S extends PC, we would have that v( (p → q)) ∈ +. On the other hand, by the -multioperator for Km once again, we would have that v( p) ∈ + and v( q) ∈ −. Since S extends PC, we would have that v( (p → q) → ( p → q)) ∈ −, falsifying axiom (K).
At this point, there are two possible ways to go: a syntactical (axiomatic) one and a semantical one. The axiomatic one is to abandon either (K) or (M1) or both in order to obtain completeness. 22 If the key idea is to propose a weaker version of Kripke's system K without necessitation, it seems very weird that the only modal axiom of this system does not hold. Besides, both (K) and (M1) are quite natural: the first one says that if an implication is necessary and the antecedent is also necessary, the consequent will be necessary too; the second one says that if the antecedent of an implication is impossible, the implication will be necessary.
These are the reasons to withdraw from the axiomatic way (at least from the perspective of dropping axioms from K), and trying the semantic one. In a relational model in which the accessibility relation is empty, all atomic formulas are necessary. By (K) we conclude that all implications will also be necessary, that is, for any formula α and β, the formulas (α → β) and ¬(α → β) are both true in any world in those models. Analogous to Kripkean semantics, in our perspective the values I + and I − must "infect" all the propositional formulas, that means, they propagate by means of implication as can be verified by the Nmatrix below:
Note that if we eliminate the values I + and I − we obtain exactly the Nmatrices for Dm. Our task now is to weaken Dm-axiomatic in order to obtain completeness.
Given that Km extends PC, disjunction and conjunction can be defined as follows: α∨β := ¬α → β and α ∧ β := ¬(α → ¬β). As a consequence of this, the corresponding multioperators are defined as follows:
From now on, the following notation for axiom schemas will be adopted: if (A) is the name of an axiom schema, and α 1 , . . . , α n is the list of formula schemas involved in it (reading from left to right), then we will write A(α 1 , . . . , α n ) to refer to the formula schema labelled by that axiom. By abuse of notation, if α 1 , . . . , α n are concrete formulas then we will also write A(α 1 , . . . , α n ) to denote a concrete instance of the formula schema A(α 1 , . . . , α n ) (when there is no risk of confusion). For instance, given formula schemas α and β then K(α, β) will denote the formula schema (α → β) → ( α → β) of (K), while M3(β, α) will denote the formula schema ♦β → ♦(α → β) labelled by (M3). Both formula schemas will denote concrete formulas whenever α and β denote concrete formulas. Now, consider the following axiom schemas:
The system Km is obtained by adding to PC the seven axiom schemas above, together with axiom schemas (M1), (M2), (DN1) and (DN2).
As usual, if Γ is a set of formulas and α is a formula, Γ ⊢ Km α means that there is a Km-proof of α from formulas in Γ. Besides, Γ Km α means that every Km-valuation that simultaneously assigns to every formula in Γ an element of +, will also assigns to α an element of +. This is the usual definition of consequence relation in Nmatrices (recall Definition 2.3). ) . Let Γ be a set of formulas and let α be a formula. Then Γ ⊢ Km α implies Γ Km α Proof. We begin by proving that any instance of an axiom schema of Km is valid in its Nmatrix. For propositional tautologies, just check that the Nmatrix for Km respects the classical truthtables of the operators ¬ and →, by considering + as true and − as false. Namely:
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness of Km
¬ + − − + → + − + + − − + +
For the modal axioms:
(K') Suppose, by absurd, that v(K ′ (α, β)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. Then v(♦α) ∈ +, v( α) ∈ +, v( (α → β)) ∈ + but v( β) ∈ −. First, we have that v(α) ∈ (T ∪C)∩(T ∪I), hence v(α) ∈ T . Besides, we have that v(α → β) ∈ T ∪ I since v( (α → β)) ∈ +. But v( β) ∈ − implies that v(β) ∈ C ∪ F and so, by definition of the multioperator → in
(K1') Suppose now that v(K1 ′ (β, α)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. Hence,
As it was proven in the case for (K), it follows that v(α) ∈ T . Since v(♦(α → β)) ∈ +, we have that v(α → β) ∈ T ∪ C. From v(♦β) ∈ − it follows that v(β) ∈ F ∪ I. Then, by the definition of →, v(α → β) ∈ F ∪ I, a contradiction.
(M3') Suppose that v(M3 ′ (α, β)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. That is, v(♦α ∨ ♦¬α) ∈ + but v(M3(β, α)) ∈ −. From the latter, we infer that v(♦β) ∈ + and so v(β) ∈ T ∪ C; however, we also conclude that v(♦(α → β)) ∈ −, hence v(α → β) ∈ F ∪ I. From this and the definition of → we get that v(α) ∈ I. But this implies that both v(♦α) ∈ − and v(♦¬α) ∈ −, and thus v(♦α ∨ ♦¬α) ∈ −, a contradicion.
(M4') Suppose now that v(M4 ′ (β, α)) ∈ − for some formulas α and β. Thus, v(♦¬β) ∈ +, v(♦¬α) ∈ + but v(♦(α → β)) ∈ −. As it was proven in the previous cases, it follows that v(β) ∈ T ∪ C and v(α) ∈ T ∪ C, but v(α → β) ⊆ F ∪ I. However, using the definition of
(I1) Just note that if v( α ∧ ¬α) ∈ + then both v( α) ∈ + and v( ¬α) ∈ +. Hence
(I2) If v( β ∧ ¬β) ∈ + then, reasoning as in the case of (I1), v(β) ∈ I. The rest of the proof is also analogous to the last case.
In addition, by observing the truth-table for → over {+, −} displayed above, it follows that MP preserves trueness, namely: if v(α) ∈ + and v(α → β) ∈ + then v(β) ∈ +, for every valuation v over the Nmatrix of Km. Now, assume that Γ ⊢ Km α and let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix of Km such that v(γ) ∈ + for every γ ∈ Γ. Taking into account that any axiom of Km is valid and that MP preserves trueness, it can be proven by induction on the length of a derivation in Km of α from Γ that v(α) ∈ +. Therefore Γ Km α.
Theorem 4.4 (Deduction metatheorem (DMT)).
Let Γ be a set of formulas and let both α and β be formulas. Thus:
Proof. Analogous to [27, p. 28] , since Km is an axiomatic extension of PC, hence MP is the only inference rule. It is easy to see that ≡ is an equivalence relation. It is not a congruence since the connective does not preserve logical equivalences, as observed by Omori and Skurt in [30, Observation 72] for the stronger system Tm (called T by the authors). Lemma 4.6. Let α be a formula in F or. Then, the following holds in Km (recallling that ♦α is a notation for the formula ¬ ¬α):
Proof. Analogous to [7, Lemma B] .
Lemma 4.7. Let Γ ∪ {α, β} be formulas of formulas in F or. Then, the following holds:
Proof. (i) By (K'), PC, (DMT) and Lemma 4.6 (i). (ii) By (K1'), PC, (DMT) and Lemma 4.6 (i) and (iii). (iii) By (K2'), PC, (DMT) and Lemma 4.6 (iii). (iv) By (M3'), PC and (DMT). (v) Analogous to (iv). (vi) By (M4'), PC and (DMT).
In order to prove completeness, some standard definitions and results form propositional logic will be recalled now (see, for instance, [34] ).
A logic L defined over a L with a consequence relation ⊢ L is said to be Tarskian if it satisfies the following, for every Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {α} ⊆ L:
A Tarskian logic L is finitary if it satisfies the following property:
It is easy to see that if Γ is ϕ-saturated then it is closed, that is, the following holds for every formula ψ: Γ ⊢ L ψ iff ψ ∈ Γ. Since Km is Tarskian and finitary (because it is defined by means of a Hilbert calculus with MP as the only inference rule, which is finitary) then the last theorem holds for Km. Definition 4.9. Let ∆ be a set of formulas which is ϕ-saturated in Km. The canonical valuation associated to ∆ is the function V ∆ :
− } defined as follows:
Given that ∆ is ϕ-saturated in Km then, for any formula α, exactly one formula in the set {α, ¬α} belongs to ∆. This shows, taking into account Lemma 4.6, that V ∆ is a well-defined function.
Lemma 4.10. Let ∆ be a set of formulas which is ϕ-saturated in Km for some formula ϕ, and let V ∆ be the canonical valuation as described in Definition 4.9. Then, V ∆ is a Km-valuation.
Proof.
CASE 1: α is ¬β.
(i) If V ∆ (β) ∈ T , then β, ♦β ∈ ∆. By (DN1) it follows that ¬¬β ∈ ∆ and by Lemma 4.6 (iv), it follows that ♦¬¬β ∈ ∆. Thus, V ∆ (¬β) ∈ F .
(ii) If V ∆ (β) ∈ C then ♦β, ♦¬β ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.6 (iv), we obtain ♦¬¬β. Thus,
CASE 2: α is β.
(ii) If V ∆ (β) ∈ C, then ♦β, ♦¬β ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.6 (i), ¬ β ∈ ∆ and V ∆ ( β) ∈ −.
(iii) If V ∆ (β) ∈ F , then ¬β, ♦¬β ∈ ∆. As above, we have ¬ β ∈ ∆ and V ∆ ( β) ∈ −.
(iv) If V ∆ (β) ∈ I, then β, ¬β ∈ ∆ and V ∆ ( β) ∈ +.
CASE 3: α is β → γ.
(i) Consider that V ∆ (β) ∈ I. Thus, β, ¬β ∈ ∆. Hence, by (I1) and PC, we obtain (β → γ), ¬(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Therefore, V ∆ (β → γ) ∈ I.
(ii) Consider now that V ∆ (γ) ∈ I. Then, γ, ¬γ ∈ ∆. Hence, by (I2) and PC, we have (
Hence, β, ♦β, ♦γ, ♦¬γ ∈ ∆. Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (iv), ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. Besides, by Lemma 4.
Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (ii), ♦¬(β → γ). Furthermore, by Lemma 4.7 (iii), we have
(viii) Suppose now that V ∆ (β) ∈ C and V ∆ (γ) ∈ F . Hence, ♦β, ♦¬β, ¬γ, ♦¬γ ∈ ∆. Thus, by Lemma 4.7 (vi), we have ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆. And by Lemma 4.7 (ii), we have
(ix) Consider now V ∆ (β) ∈ F and V ∆ (γ) ∈ T . Thus, ¬β, ♦¬β, γ, ♦γ ∈ ∆. On the one hand, by (M2) we have (β → γ) ∈ ∆ . On the other hand, we obtain ♦(β → γ) ∈ ∆, by Lemma 4.7 (v) . Therefore, V ∆ (β → γ) ∈ T .
(x) Let also V ∆ (β) ∈ F and V ∆ (γ) ∈ C. Thus, ¬β, ♦¬β, ♦γ, ♦¬γ ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.6 (iii) and (M1), we have (β → γ) ∈ ∆. Furthermore, by Lemma 4.7 (vi), we obtain
(xi) Finally, let V ∆ (β) ∈ F and V ∆ (γ) ∈ F . Hence, β, ♦¬β, ¬γ, ♦¬γ ∈ ∆. As above, by Lemma 4.6 (iii), (M1) and Lemma 4.7 (vi), we conclude that V ∆ (β → γ) ∈ T .
Corollary 4.11. Let ∆ be a set of formulas which is ϕ-saturated in Km for some formula ϕ. Then, the funcion V ∆ is a Km-valuation such that, for every formula α:
Proof. By Definition 4.9, V ∆ is a function such that V ∆ (α) ∈ + iff α ∈ ∆. By Lemma 4.10, V ∆ is a Km-valuation.
Theorem 4.12 (Completeness of Km). Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas in F or. Then:
Proof. Suppose that Γ Km α. By Theorem 4.8 there exists a set ∆ of formulas such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ is α-saturated in Km. Then, α ∈ ∆. By Corollary 4.11, V ∆ is a Km-valuation such that V ∆ (γ) ∈ + for every γ ∈ Γ, but V ∆ (α) ∈ +. Therefore Γ Km α. Proof. It is a consequence of Theorems 4.12 and 4.3, and the fact that ⊢ Km is finitary.
Let K4m be the system obtained by adding to Km the schema axiom (4). It is very easy to check that this system is sound and complete with respect to K4m-Nmatrices. For soundness, we just observe that if v( α) ∈ + then v( α) ∈ {T + , I + } and thus v( α) ∈ +. For completeness, note that: (i) if V ∆ (β) ∈ T , then β, ♦β ∈ ∆ and then, by (4), β ∈ ∆ and V ∆ ( β) ∈ {T + , I + }; if (ii) V ∆ (β) ∈ I, then β, ¬β ∈ ∆ and, once again by (4), β ∈ ∆. Hence V ∆ ( β) ∈ {T + , I + } too. Consider now the K45m system obtained by adding to K4m the schema axiom (5). It is not difficult to check that this system is sound and complete with respect to K45m-Nmatrices.
Hence, by (5) and Lemma 4.6 (i), ¬ β, ¬ β ∈ ∆ and V ∆ ( β) ∈ {F − , I − }; if (ii) V ∆ (β) ∈ F , then ¬β, ♦¬β ∈ ∆ and, once again by (5) and Lemma 4.6 (i), ¬ β, ¬ β ∈ ∆ and V ∆ ( β) ∈ {F − , I − } too.
Recovering a logic inside another
The so-called recovery operators play a fundamental role in the class of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (in short, LFIs, see for instance [5] ). Recall that a given logic S is an LFI if it is paraconsistent w.r.t. some negation ¬ (that is, there are formulas α and β such that α, ¬α S β). In addition, there is a (primitive of defined) unary connective • in S, which is called a consistency operator, such that α, ¬α, •α ⊢ S β for every formula α and β. 23 Given a logic S which is an LFI contained in a presentation of PC in the same signature of S, then the consistency operator • allows us to recover PC inside S as follows: for every (finite) set Γ ∪ {α} of formulas,
The relation stated above is called a Derivability Adjustment Theorem (DAT). The technique of DATs was originally proposed by D. Batens in the framework of Adaptive logics, but this idea, together with the notion of consistency operators, was already used by N. da Costa for his well-known hierarchy of paraconsistent systems called C n (see [12] ). The basic LFI called mbC has the following axiom (called gently explosion law): •α → (α → (¬α → β)). This axiom, together with the others, guarantees the existence of a DAT between mbC and PC. Observe that the standard explosion law α → (¬α → β) of PC is recovered in mbC by adding the additional assumption •α (namely, 'α is consistent'). Namely, •α ⊢ mbC α → (¬α → β).
It is worth noting that the system Km was obtained from Dm by weakening some of its axioms, by using a technique similar to that of LFIs. Specifically, axioms (K), (K1), (K2), (M3) and (M4) of Dm can only be applied in Km under certain assumptions, such as ♦α or ♦¬β. This suggest the possibility of defining a formula which plays the role of a recovery operator in Km with respect to Dm. Definition 5.1. For any formula α, let •α := α → ♦α be the recovery operator for Km with respect to Dm.
Observe that the formula schema •α is D(α), the formula schema of the axiom schema (D). It is also worth noting that the formula •α is equivalent to ♦α ∨ ♦¬α in Km. The multioperator associated to • in the Nmatrix for Km is defined as follows:
That is, •α receives a designated truth-value if and only if α receives a value out of I = {I + , I − }; that is, if and only if α receives a truth-value in the Nmatrix for Dm. Boths aspects, namely: the syntactical one, concerning • as being a recovery operator, and the semantical one, in which • 'marks out' exactly the truth-values in Dm, will be fundamental in order to obtain a DAT for Km with respect to Dm (see Theorem 5.7 below). If we consider the formula •α as denoting the 'modal consistency' of α, then •α := ¬•α would be a formula denoting the 'modal inconsistency' of α. This terminology is suggested by the theory of Logics of Formal Inconsistency. Observe that •α is equivalent in Km to α ∧ ¬α, the formula used in axioms (I1) and (I2). Clearly, the truth-value of •α is designated if and only if the truth-value of α is in {I + , I − }. In order to obtain a DAT between Km and Dm, it is necessary to guarantee that •α recovers all the axioms from Dm which were weakened in Km. Recall the notation introduced in Notation 4.2.
Lemma 5.2. Let α be a formula. Then:
Proof. Let Km • be the system obtained from Km by replacing the axiom schemas (K'), (K1'), (K2'), (M3'), (M4'), (I1) and (I2) by the following seven axiom schemas:
Proposition 5.3. The systems Km and Km • coincide, that is:
Proof. By Lemma 5.2 (4)- (10) Remark 5.4. The latter result clearly shows that Km can be seen as a weak version of Dm in which some axioms (or principles) are weakened and controlled by means of a modal consistency recovery operator •, such that the corresponding modal inconsistency operator • satisfies certain propagation properties (described by axioms (I1') and (I2')). This is analogous to the case of LFIs, as explained above. Observe that (I1') and (I2') are equivalent in Km to
which are properties of retropropagation of the modal consistency operator •. Now, a simple but relevant technical result concerning Nmatrices will be stated. Recall from [8] the notion of submultialgebra. It states that a multialgebra A is a submultialgebra of another B, denoted by A ⊆ sm B provided that: both are defined over the same signature; the domain A of A is contained in the domain B of B; and c A ( a) ⊆ c B ( a) for every n-ary connective c and any a ∈ A n . Here, c A and c B denote the multioperations associated to the connective c in A and B, respectively. Proof. It is immediate from the definition of valuation over an Nmatrix, and from Proposition 5.5.
Theorem 5.7 (DAT between Km and Dm). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F or be a set of formulas. Then:
Proof. ('Only if ' part) We begin by proving the following (recalling Notation 4.2):
Consider the following derivation in Km:
1.
•α (hyp) 2. α 1 . . .
The above derivation shows that •α ⊢ Km K(α, β). The proof for axiom (K2) is similar, but now by using axiom (K2").
The proof of Fact 2 is analogous to the one given for Fact 1, but now by using axioms (K1") and (M4"). Fact 3: •α ⊢ Km M3(β, α) for every formula α, β. The proof of Fact 3 is similar to that for Fact 1, but now by using axiom (M3").
Now, suppose that Γ ⊢ Dm ϕ. Then, there is a finite sequence of formulas α 1 · · · α n such that α n = ϕ and, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either α i ∈ Γ, or α i is an instance of an axiom of Dm, or there are j, k < i such that α i is obtained from α j and α k by MP. In case that every instance of an axiom used in such derivation corresponds to axioms of Km, then Γ ⊢ Km ϕ and so it suffices to take Υ = ∅. Otherwise, let α i be a formula in the derivation above which was included only because it is an instance of an axiom (A) in Dm, and assume that (A) is not an axiom in Km. Now, consider the formula schema • ′ α := ( α → α) ∧ ( ¬α → ¬α) (recalling that β ∧ γ is a notation for ¬(β → ¬γ)). With the notation for axioms stated in Notation 4.2, it follows that • ′ α corresponds to T (α) ∧ T (¬α), where T is the formula schema of axiom (T). In addition, observe that, in A Dm ,
is a value in A Tm , for every valuation v for M Dm . This being so, and by a technique analogous to that used in the proof of Theorem 5.7, the following DATs can be easily proved:
Theorem 5.8 (DAT between Dm and Tm). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F or be a finite set of formulas. Then:
Theorem 5.9 (DAT between Km and Tm). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F or be a finite set of formulas. Then:
A deterministic implication
In 1996, M. Baaz expanded the infinite-valued Gödel logic with an unary operator called ∆ defined as follows: ∆(1) = 1, and ∆(x) = 0 otherwise (see [3] ). The (dual of the) same operator was already considered by A. Monteiro, inspired by an example given in 1963 by L. Monteiro [28] , to consider in 1978 the variety TMA of tetravalent modal algebras, which expand the De Morgan algebras. This is why this kind of operator is now called Monteiro-Baaz ∆ operator. In the context of fuzzy logic, P. Hájeck considered BL ∆ , the expansion of the basic fuzzy logic BL by the ∆ operator, whose axioms concerning ∆ are the following (see [18, Chapter 2]):
besides the Generalization inference rule, analogous to necessitation rule in normal modal systems. As observed by Hájeck, the ∆ operator is a kind of mixed modality which satisfies properties of an (alethic) necessity operator, as well as a property, namely axiom (∆2), of a possibility operator.
In this section, we will consider → as a completely deterministic multioperator, under the perspective of interpreting as a kind of (non-deterministic) ∆ operator. Because of axiom (∆3), it is natural of start with system Tm. Given that α ∨ ¬α is equivalent in Tm to α → α, then satisfies axiom (∆1). In addition, axiom (∆5) corresponds to axiom (K), which is valid in Tm. However, neither (∆2) nor (∆4) are valid in Tm. Clearly (∆4) corresponds to axiom (4), hence the operator together with the implication from system T4m satisfy all the properties of a ∆ operator, with the exception of (∆2).
In order to satisfy axiom (∆2), recall that α ∨ β := ¬α → β. This being so, the implication should be deterministic in such a way that the induced disjunction becomes the join (maximum) operator in the chain
The Nmatrix obtained from the one for Tm by changing the original multiperator for → by the (deterministic) operator above was already considered by Ivlev under the name of Sā. He proposes the following additional axiom to characterize this system: Proof. It follows form the fact that the schema α → ♦α is derivable in PC∪{(T), (DN1), (DN2)} (see [7] ).
From the last result, it follows that Tmd is equivalent to adding axiom (Kdet) to Tm. Theorem 6.3. System Tmd is sound and complete w.r.t. the Nmatrix for Tm in which the original multiperator for → is replaced by the deterministic operator of the truth-table above.
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Proof. For soundness, it worth noting that the Nmatrix for Tmd restrains the Nmatrix for Tm. This means that any valuation over the Nmatrix for Tmd is a valuation over the Nmatrix for Tm. Hence, for Tm-soundness proved in [6] and [7] , we have to check only the axiom (Kdet). Thus, let α, β ∈ F or and let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix for Tmd such that v( (α → β)) and v(♦α) are designated. Then v(α → β) = T + and v(α) = F − . Thus, v(β) = T + and (v β) is designated. We conclude that v(Kdet) is designated too.
For completeness, note that Lemma 4.6 holds good for Tmd. We have to make some adjustment in the proof of [6, Lemma 4] by changing, for instance, the values t n , t c , f c and f i by T + , C + ,C − and F − , respectively. In addition, ∆ is now an α-saturated set containing Γ such that Γ Tmd α. Other adjustment that must be made is to eliminate the rule (DN), what is was done in [7] . Now, three new cases must be considered:
by (Kdet) and Lemma 4.6 (i) we would have γ, ¬ γ ∈ ∆ and ∆ would be inconsistent, an absurd. By PC, Lemma 4.6 (i) and the fact that ∆ is α-saturated, we have that V ∆ (β → γ) = C + .
(ii) If V ∆ (γ) = V ∆ (β) = C − , then ♦β, ♦γ, ¬β, ¬γ ∈ ∆. If (β → γ) ∈ ∆, by (Kdet) and (T) we would have γ ∈ ∆ and ∆ would be inconsistent. By the same reasons, we have
If ¬♦β ∈ ∆, by Lemma 4.6 (iii) and (T), we would have ¬β ∈ ∆ and ∆ would be inconsistent, an absurd. Thus ♦β ∈ ∆. In this case, by (Kdet) and Lemma 4.6 (i), we will have γ ∈ ∆. Again, by the same reasons as above, we conclude that
It is easy to see that axiom (∆2) holds in Tmd, hence it satisfies all the axioms for a ∆ operator with the exception of axiom (∆4). This justifies the definition of the following system: Definition 6.4. Let Tm4d be the Hilbert calculus obtained from Tmd by adding schema axiom (4). Equivalently, Tm4d is obtained from Tm4 by changing axiom (K1) by (Kdet).
Theorem 6.5. System Tm4d is sound and complete w.r.t. the Nmatrix for T4m in which the original multiperator for → is replaced by the deterministic operator → .
Proof. We just have to add in Theorem 6.3 the case when α = β. This case, in fact, was checked in [6, Theorem 17] .
Clearly, the logic Tm4d satisfies all the axioms for a ∆ operator. This being so, is a kind of non-deterministic ∆ operator, in which the necessation rule does not hold. It is worth noting that is the only non-deterministic connective of Tm4d. This means that the extension of Tm4d obtained by adding schema axiom (5), namely, the system Tm45d, is a system characterized by a standard logical matrix, since is also deterministic. By re-interpreting its truth-values T + , C + , C − , F − as 1, 2/3, 1/3 and 0, respectively, and by observing that → and ∨ are inter-definable in Tm4d (hence in Tm45d), the logical matrix of Tm45d corresponds to the {¬, ∨}-fragment of 4-valued Lukasiewicz logic L4 expanded with this operator simular (but weaker) to Monteiro-Baaz ∆, and in which {1, 2/3} are designated. As we shall see in the next section, Tm45d is the only modal system presented in this paper which is characterizable by a single finite deterministic matrix.
The inevitability of non-determinism
In 1940, Dugundji showed that no modal system between S1 and S5 can be characterized by a single finite logical matrix. Since then, several generalizations of that theorem were obtained, showing that practically no modal system considered in the literature can be characterized by a single finite logical matrix. On the other hand, each of the systems considered in this paper (with exception of Tm45d, mentioned at the end of the previous section) is characterized by a single finite-valued non-deterministic matrix. A natural question is to determine whether nondeterministic matrices are intrinsically necessary in order to characterize such systems, or if its possible to characterize (some of) them by means of a single finite (ordinary) logical matrix.
The aim of this section is showing that the above question has a negative answer. Indeed, two Dugundji-like theorems will be obtained (Theorems 7.4 and 7.8), proving that none of the systems considered in the previous sections (with exception of Tm45d) can be characterized by a a single finite logical matrix. These results justify the use of non-deterministic matrices as a semantic tool for dealing with them.
To begin with, some notation will be introduced. If Γ = {α 1 , . . . , α n } is a finite family of n formulas in F or, with n ≥ 2, then Γ will denote the formula ((. . .
Definition 7.1. Let n ≥ 3 be a natural number, and let p 1 , . . . p n be n different propositional variables. We define the following formula schema: 3 be a natural number, and let p 1 , . . . p n be n different propositional variables. We define the following formula schema:
where α(n) = {p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} and β i (n) = {p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j = i} for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Proposition 7.6. Let S ∈ {Tmd, T4md}. Let M = M, D be a (deterministic) logical matrix such that M has n elements, and M is a model of S. Then, M validates the formula γ(n + 1).
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Proposition 7.2. Proposition 7.7. Let S ∈ {Tmd, T4md}. Then, the formula γ(n) is not a theorem of S, for every n ≥ 3.
Proof. Let v be a valuation over the Nmatrix for S such that v(p j ) = C + for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, v(α(n)) = v(β i (n)) = C + for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since the disjunction is deterministic. Now, assume that v( α(n)) = F − and v( β i (n)) = C − , for every i (note that this is always possible, from the definition of the multioperator of the Nmatrix for S). From this, v(¬ α(n)) = T + and v( β i (n)) = C + , for every i. This being so, v( ¬ α(n)) is designated but v( ¬ β i (n)) is not. Hence, v(( ¬ α(n) → ¬ β i (n)) is not designated, for every i, and so v(γ(n)) is not designated. From this, γ(n)) is not a valid formula for the Nmatrix for S and so, by soundness, it is not a theorem of S. Theorem 7.8. Let S ∈ {Tmd, T4md}. Then, S cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic logical matrix.
Proof. Suppose, by absurd, that S can be semantically characterized by a finite logical matrix M with n elements. As in the proof of Theorem 7.4 it follows that n ≥ 2.
By Proposition 7.6 it follows that M validates the formula γ(n + 1). Given that S is complete w.r.t. M, the formula γ(n+1) is a theorem of S. But this contradicts Proposition 7.7. Therefore, S cannot be characterized by a single finite logical matrix.
Finally, it will be shown that all the modal systems introduced above are conservative extensions of classical propositional logic PC: Proposition 7.9. Every system S between Km and T45m is a conservative extension of classical propositional logic PC. That is, given a formula α over the signature {¬, →}, α is valid in S iff α is valid in PC.
Proof. Given that S is an extension of PC, it follows that any valid formula of PC is valid in S. Now, suppose that α is not valid in PC. Then, there is a 2-valued classical valuation v such that v(α) = 0. It is clear that the 2-valued Boolean algebra for PC can be defined with domain {T + , F − } such that T + corresponds to 1 and F − corresponds to 0. Moreover, this algebra, seen as a multialgebra, is a submultialgebra of the Nmatrix of T45m, and its designated truth-value is also designated in T45m. From this, the valuation v can be seen as a valuationv over the Nmatrix of T45m such thatv(β) is designated iff v(β) = 1, for every formula β. Thus, the formula α is not valid in T45m, whence it is not valid in S.
Final Remarks and Future Work
Although we have presented an interpretation for Ivlev's semantics, we do not want to argue that the Nmatrices presented here for negation and for modal operators better capture the natural language use of negation, implication and modal operators. There are many possibilities for defining these operators such that all the resulting systems are (conservative) extensions of classical logic. We have presented here only a few of them that already exist in the literature, and that seemed reasonable enough.
From our previous discussion and from the results obtained here, we believe that there are good reasons to deal with modal logics without any introduction rule for modal operators like the necessitation rule. The absence of any modal inference rule allows us to consider a radical distinction between a formula being tautology and being necessary, in a similar way that Kripke semantics radically separates the notions between being necessary and being a priori.
We also believe that non-deterministic semantics has a promising future in several fields of logic, in particular, modal logic. In the case of propositional modal logic in alethic contexts, they could solve paradoxes that are formulated by the use of the necessitation rule, such as Fitch's paradox, for example. In deontic contexts, systems weaker than D could solve deontic paradoxes, like Chisholm's paradox.
There are many technical results to be explored in this field. Lemmon and Scott have proved in [26] a generalized result of completeness through Kripke semantics. 26 Let n and ♦ n be denoting n-iterations of those operators. Given an axiom schema of the form
for some fixed natural numbers k, l, m, n, it is possible to obtain an accessibility property between the worlds so that the class of models having this property will characterize the system obtained by adding to K the given axiom schema. An analogous result could be obtained by means of non-deterministic semantics. By varying the number of truth-values chosen by the multioperator interpreting the connective (while keeping fixed the multioperators for negation and implication), we have a finite number of submultialgebras between Tm and T45m. In fact, there are 2 4 = 16 possible multioperators for the modal connective, hence 16 multialgebras can be defined as stipulated above. There are, therefore, 14 systems between Tm and T45m. The problem here is how to obtain an axiom schema such that, added to Tm, produces completeness. The same could be done for the other connectives by considering, for example, only those Nnmatrices that extend the classical propositional logic. The previous arguments could also be applied to Dm and Km.
In another line of research, the generalization of modal Nmatrices to swap structures semantics proposed in [9] opens interesting possibilities for Ivlev-like modal systems with respect to algebraizability in a wide sense (see [8] ). Thus, it would be interesting the study of the modal systems proposed here and the ones analyzed in [10] from the broader perspective of swap structures.
Finally, another kind of non-deterministic semantics could be applied to Ivlev-like modal systems. For instance, Fidel structures (a.k.a. F-structures) could be defined for some of these systems. F-structures were originally proposed by M. Fidel in 1977 for da Costa's paraconsistent systems C n (see [16] ), proving for the first time the decidability of such systems. The possibletranslations semantics introduced by W. Carnielli in [4] could also we applied to this kind of modal systems. More details about non-deterministic semantics and their relationships can be found in [5, Chapter 6] .
We believe that the considerations above show the legitimacy, the importance and the promising future of non-deterministic semantics applied to propositional modal logic. The generalization of this framework to first-order logics is the subject of a forthcoming paper.
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